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Evolving capabilities and innovative
intentionality: Some reflections on the role
of intention within innovation processes 
SUMMARY We may argue that individual and organisational dynamic capabilities evolve
through the interaction of intentions and action goals. Capabilities are renewed
and reshaped by the appearance of new action goals. A feedback process between
capabilities and goals opens up new possibilities of action. This may happen
when agents (organisations and individuals) act towards their goals, trans-
forming capabilities and renewing the spaces where actions are conceived and
deployed. Moreover, agents’ goals vary not only in the sense that they are different
but also because they are characterised by different transforming intensities. The
concept of innovative intentionality synthesizes this idea. Innovative
intentionality is defined as the will to conceive or imagine realities which differ
from the perceived realities, with the purpose of making them effective. This
concept appears to be useful for addressing the divergence of innovative dynamics
among organisations and societies.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Within the evolutionary tradition, econom-ic and social systems become evolving 
systems characterised by constant endogenous
change brought about by the generation of nov-
elties which result in its self-transformation over
time (Rubio de Urquía 2003). Evolution is seen
as a system’s self-transformation (Witt 2003: 12–
13). It is also perceived as ‘a process, or a cluster
of processes, which combine the generation of
novelties and the selective retention of some of
the novelties generated’ (Loasby 2001: 1).
Self-transformation processes are necessarily
encompassed – and to a great extent explained –
by changes in agents’ knowledge (whether agents
are organisations or individuals); that is, by learn-
ing processes. These are key explanatory factors of
economic change: the knowledge acquired by
agents and the interaction of the different agents’
knowledge form the basis on which the evolu-
tionary and complex character of economic
processes rely. In particular, the literature devoted
to explaining the development of evolving eco-
nomic systems accords an essential explanatory
role to agents’ capabilities, which are dynamic as
they are transformed over time (Loasby 1999,
2006).
If we take a closer look at the phenomena
addressed by evolutionary economists (basically
self-transformation and novelty emergence in
economic systems) and at the concepts they use
and develop to build their theories (e.g. entrepre-
neurship, innovation, dynamic capabilities), we
observe that they all refer to processes which are
deployed over time. Moreover, we could actually
state that evolutionary economists have assumed
the challenge of moving away from the timeless
economic system (Schakle 1972, 1979) to the intri-
cate world of complex dynamics (Dopfer & Potts
2004; Potts 2000).
From an analytical point of view, shifting from
the standard economics timeless system of rational
choice to evolving systems means assuming the
temporary dimension of economic action which
is essentially a projective action. It therefore imp-
lies moving away from ‘the technology of choice
framework’ (Encinar & Muñoz 2006) in which
agents make choices on the basis of given means,
given goals (objectives) of action and perfect and
complete knowledge about the states of the
world, and then perform actions in a timeless
environment.
The acceptance of the inherent temporary
dimension of human action implies the need to
address the great importance that agents’ past tra-
jectories have in determining action and choice.
It also implies taking into account that a choice is
made from imaginable alternative future scenar-
ios. Action is directed towards an uncertain,
unknown future that agents imagine according to
their cognition of reality, their beliefs, values, etc;
all of which depend on individual trajectories and
psychological make-up, and on the social collec-
tive environment (Borrás 2004; Rubio de Urquía
2005).
We cannot understand human behaviour –
and therefore economic behaviour – and its trans-
formation only on the basis of the existent reality
or on past reality. It is also necessary to consider
future unreality because it is in the future that
goals are located; the objectives formulated by
individuals and groups of individuals. Actions
(e.g. producing, consuming, innovating, working,
organising) are conditioned by agents’ desired
(Pareto 1909; Shackle 1972: 135) and pursued
goals which vary greatly and are submitted to
change over time. As a consequence, diversity and
changes in pursued goals should be considered
key explanatory elements of the process of 
self-transformation (evolution) of social and eco-
nomic systems. Important features of novelty
generation and innovation processes may be
addressed by focusing on the dynamics of the
agents’ formulation of goals.1 These are the imag-
ined realities deemed possible and desirable
towards which the agent orients his/her/its action
(Loasby 1996; Cañibano 2004; Cañibano, Enci-
nar & Muñoz 2004, 2006). In this sense, we refer
to enacted intention: imaging or desiring a future
scenario (a possible reality or goal) does not imply
 
any changes in the environment unless the agent
orients her action according to those goals; unless
she acts towards the goal.
The purpose of this paper is to develop some
reflections which are based on the above ideas
and which have led us to consider the essential
role that enacted intention plays within economic
dynamics.
We argue that the constant feedback between
enacted intention (oriented by action goals) 
and capabilities transforms the economic system.
Action goals may evolve over time and by doing
so they bring about changes in the capabilities of
agents that might also result in the establishment
of renewed intentions and goals, and therefore in
the development of re-shaped or renewed capa-
bilities. In order to develop these arguments, we
first focus on the evolutionary concept of dyn-
amic capabilities (Section 2), because the role of
intention and the genuine temporary dimension
of action are recognised in this literature. Moving
on from dynamic to evolving capabilities allows 
us to go further in the understanding of self-
transformation processes.
Furthermore, considering agents’ intention-
ality enables us to reflect on the explanation of
transformation intensity and trajectory. Why do
organisations (and their capabilities) evolve in
different ways? The proposed concept of innova-
tive intentionality, will give an important theoreti-
cal role to enacted intention in the explanation 
of economic change. The paper may, therefore,
be located within the discussion on micro-
foundations of organisational and individual
capabilities and their consequences in terms of
economic dynamics (Felin & Foss 2005, 2006;
Loasby 2006).
The following section addresses dynamic 
capability building processes as intended learning
processes. The argument moves then to the propo-
sition of the concept of evolving capabilities: the
constant feedback between enacted intention and
capabilities results in the evolution of capabilities
(Section 3). In the discussion of evolving capabil-
ities the role of innovative intentionality arises.
Innovative intentionality is defined as the will to
conceive or imagine realities which differ from
the perceived realities, with the purpose of mak-
ing them effective (Section 4). These considera-
tions and proposed concepts provide, in our view,
the possibility to keep the dynamic consistency of
the evolutionary approach, particularly because
important sources of novelty may be located in
the goals side of action. In this sense, they might
prove useful for further explorations of economic
dynamics, evolution and entrepreneurship.
2. DYNAMIC CAPABILITIES AS
INTENTIONAL LEARNING
Learning and knowledge acquisition processes are
central to the explanation of economic change.
Recent attempts to provide an analytical founda-
tion of evolutionary economics describe econom-
ic evolution as ‘a growth of knowledge process’
(Dopfer & Potts 2004: 21). As Metcalfe and Fos-
ter (2004: xi) recognise, knowledge acquired by
individual agents and the interaction of agents’
knowledge constitute the basis for evolution and
complexity of economic process. An extended lit-
erature has been devoted to the analysis of knowl-
edge acquisition, use and management within
organisations that need to cope with uncertainty
and adapt to a rapidly changing environment,
overcoming varying technological challenges.
General agreement on the idea that a great 
proportion of organisational and individual
knowledge is tacit (Polanyi 1959) has lead to the
development of a variety of concepts which
address tacit knowledge in different ways and
which have been widely used in the literature:
know-how, skills, competences, routines, capaci-
ties, capabilities. In one way or another, all these
concepts refer to the abilities that organisations
(and individuals) have in order to reach their
goals. Indeed, the fact that an organisation wants
to attain a certain goal does not mean that it has
the capacity to undertake the necessary actions to
achieve it.
Consider the following very simple example:
the managers of a firm wish to increase competi-
tive advantage by providing personal distribution
services to their local clients by taking advantage
of a good offer to hire a pool of cars. However,
they do not want to increase costs by hiring new
personnel, so if their present employees cannot
drive, the firm will lack the skills to fulfil its pur-
pose. The firm lacks competence; the employees
do not know how to drive. The need for new
capabilities in order to provide new services aris-
es. The knowledge of the organisation needs to be
increased: some employees should learn how to
drive but also new mechanisms for organising the
new distribution service efficiently should be
implemented. As a result, new organisational rou-
tines may emerge. It should be noted that in this
example the intention of the agent is clearly
defined from the beginning.
Dosi et al. (2000: 2–4) have contributed to
shedding some light on the different concepts –
‘floating in the literature like icebergs in the Artic
Sea’ – related to organisational know-how 
by focusing on the notion of capabilities and 
by establishing a clear difference between organ-
isational routines and capabilities. As this differ-
ence is based on the role of intention, it is of
utmost relevance within the scope of our general
argument.
Let us consider the following definitions of
‘dynamic capabilities’:
Dynamic capabilities are the ability to recon-
figure, redirect, transform, and appropriately
shape and integrate existing core competences
with external resources and strategic and com-
plementary assets to meet the challenges of 
a time-pressured, rapidly changing Schum-
peterian world of competition and imitation.
[They] reflect an organisation’s ability to
achieve new and innovative forms of competi-
tive advantage […]
(Teece, Pisano & Shuen 2000: 339)2
A dynamic capability is a learned pattern of
collective activity through which the organisa-
tion systematically generates and modifies its
operational routines in pursuit of improved
effectiveness. (Zollo & Winter 1999: 10)
From the above definitions it could be said that
the process of acquiring or developing dynamic
capabilities is a collective learning process from
which the organisation improves its ability to
achieve its goals (‘achieving new and innovative
forms of competitive advantage’, ‘improving
effectiveness’). For Dosi et al. (2000: 2–4):
To be capable of some thing is to have a gener-
ally reliable capacity to bring that thing about
as a result of intended action. Capabilities fill
the gap between intention and outcome, and
they fill it in such a way that the outcome
bears a definite resemblance to what was
intended […] It is in the building of organisa-
tional capabilities that the role of intentionali-
ty is most reliably displayed […] we think of
‘capability’ as fairly large scale unit of analysis,
one that has a recognisable purpose expressed
in terms of the significant outcomes it is 
supposed to enable, and that is significantly
shaped by conscious decision both in its devel-
opment and its deployment. These features
distinguish ‘capabilities’ from ‘organisational
routines’ […]
Capabilities are driven by intention, by the ten-
dency of the agent towards a goal. In this sense
we can state that the capability building process is
an intended learning process. Capabilities are
dynamic because they cannot be represented by a
closed structure as is the case of the technology of
choice timeless system. In such a system, organi-
sations only face allocation problems where the
means to reach the pursued goals (limited to
maximize profits and utility functions) are given.
When agents have perfect and complete knowl-
edge, the possibility of a gap between intention
and outcome is excluded.
Maintaining the assumption that economic
behaviour is based on the formulation and the
interactive deployment of projective linkages
from means to pursed goals – that is to say, of
action plans3 (Rubio de Urquía 2005; Cañibano,
Encinar & Muñoz 2006) – we could interpret
the evolutionary approach to organisational
dynamics as a way of ‘opening’ the means side of
projective action. The opening results from the
assumption that organisations do not have per-
fect and complete knowledge to reach their goals;
they follow different patterns to acquire and 
use new knowledge or, in other words, different
learning patterns. Learning will lead to the devel-
opment of different abilities that will make them
more or less effective (effectiveness being meas-
ured precisely by ‘the gap between intention and
outcome’, between purpose and real results).
At the same time, opening this means side
implies the acceptance of heterogeneity in organi-
sations. Each one will follow its own learning pat-
tern, resulting in different sets of capabilities and
therefore, in different levels of effectiveness.
Teece, Pisano and Shuen (2000: 336–7) follow
the resource-based perspective by seeing in
resources, capabilities and endowments key
sources of heterogeneity in firms. However, they
do it in a dynamic way, in the sense that what it
is considered most relevant, within the dynamic
capabilities approach, is the ability to perform
managerial strategies for developing new capabili-
ties. Expressions like ‘skill acquisition’, ‘learning’,
and ‘accumulation of organisational and intangi-
ble assets’ show the dynamic dimension of the
discussion.
Thus, the different ways in which organisa-
tions (and individuals) face and undertake this
process of collective learning and capability
building is an important source of heterogeneity.
However, key questions need to be addressed:
‘what accounts for the fact that one organisation
exhibits competence in some sense, while another
does not?’ (Zollo & Winter 1999: 3); ‘how are
dynamic capabilities formed?, [how] do they
evolve?’ (ibid: 4); ‘[w]hat mechanisms are involv-
ed in the creation and evolution of dynamic 
capabilities?’ (ibid: 10). The dynamic capabilities
approach opens up a vast research area which
should be used to identify features characterizing
the different patterns of collective intended learn-
ing that result in the development of new organi-
sational capabilities. Scholars’ attention is being
drawn to the important question of ‘how?’ (How
are capabilities formed? how do they evolve?),
which shows again the dynamic dimension of the
discourse. As capabilities evolve differently in dif-
ferent organisations which perform with diverse
levels of effectiveness, there is no doubt about the
interest in understanding the features which
explain those different processes. If we consider
the question ‘why do organisations develop capa-
bilities?’ we will find the answer in the above
paragraphs: The organisation builds capabilities
in order to be in a better position to attain an
intended goal.
All explanations and definitions presented so
far in this section have considered the intended
goal as a given goal: A process of capability 
building is encouraged given a certain goal [‘a
recognisable purpose expressed in terms of the
significant outcomes [the capability] is supposed
to enable’ (Dosi et al. 2000: 4)]. New capabilities
are therefore built, new patterns of behaviour
arise, learning takes place and might be reflected
in new actions and different ways of doing things
(process innovations). After a certain time and a
degree of repetition (which may vary greatly
depending on the organisation) all those new pat-
terns and actions may turn into habits. Although
the organisation’s goals do not disappear and
although the initial purpose remains, people start
doing things without deploying processes of con-
scious deliberation. Actions will become regular,
predictable, routinised. New members being
taken on by the organisation might adopt these
patterns of behaviour (routines), without neces-
sarily knowing their origin or what they were
intended for. In this sense routinised actions may
be qualified as unintended, as not including ele-
ments of intentionality and deliberation (Dosi et
al. 2000: 12). However, they are the result of an
evolutionary process which finds its explanation
and origin in the pursued goal that engenders the
learning process.
It seems reasonable to state that over time spe-
cific capabilities are converted into routines. This
is how the organisation may focus on new prob-
lems and deploy new learning processes. Simon’s
discussion on bounded rationality leads to this
idea. ‘Bounded rationality makes agents deal with
one or a few problems at a time, in the expecta-
tion that when other problems arise there would
be time to deal with those too’ (Simon 1983: 20).
This argument is directly linked to the concept of
routine which is reformulated later in evolution-
ary perspective by Nelson & Winter (1982) as 
is suggested by the lecture of the Darwinian
metaphor proposed by Witt (2003: 10–11). For
an excellent survey on routines see Becker (2004).
Several questions arise at this point. Why does
the organisation continue learning (in the event
that it does, as assumed within the evolutionary
approach (Dosi et al. 1996))? Does it continue to
build new capabilities? Why? Does the learning
process (or the acquisition of knowledge) have an
end or is it continuously dynamic?
As has been previously pointed out, we consid-
er that economic behaviour consists basically 
in the formulation and interactive deployment 
of action plans (Encinar & Muñoz 2005). An
action plan is the projective allocation of means
(actions) to goals. Three possibilities arise when
we take into account the relationship between
means and goals of action. As has been argued
above, the first refers to the situation in which
means, as well as goals are given, since they are
located in the technology of choice timeless sys-
tem. Within this framework, the discussion on
capabilities and intention has no sense as only
static problems are dealt with.
A second possibility is illustrated by the
dynamic capabilities’ discourse. In which agents
pursue a given goal, which implies a given inten-
tion. In this case, the learning process would end
when the gap between intention and outcome
disappears; in other words, when capabilities are
improved in such a way that they enable the satis-
factory attainment of the intended goal. Thus, it
is the enacted intention of reaching a certain goal
that brings about capability building. This is
what gives intentionality such an important role
in the process: ‘it is in the building of organisa-
tional capabilities that the role of intentionality is
most reliably displayed’ (Dosi et al. 2000: 2). The
goal might not be attained quickly if it is a very
challenging one,4 it might never be attained 
if it is technically unfeasible5 or in the event 
that the organisation is incapable of learning and
performing the needed actions. The latter case
includes the situation in which interaction with
other agents (individuals, organisations) trans-
forms the action space of the organisation, alter-
ing its plans and complicating the learning
process. But the intended goal might be also
attained if it is technically feasible and the organ-
isation is able to deploy the necessary actions (e.g.
learning, adapting, building capabilities) to suc-
ceed in its purpose. Once this happens there is no
apparent reason for the learning dynamic process
to continue.
When means are not provided, agents have to
find those which are most appropriate to reach-
ing their (given) goals. They will learn through
intended search, through interaction, they might
discover completely new ways of organizing
actions, they will develop competence, build
capabilities, and they might even invent new tan-
gible artefacts that will suit their aspirations.
Opening the means side permits us to address,
within the domain of economic theory, dynamic
processes of innovation and novelty creation,
which is not possible in the technology of choice
system where rational efficient choice is made
instantaneously. Nevertheless, once the given goal
has been reached, the evolutionary dynamic
learning process is condemned to an end, to
arrive at a stationary state where novelty and
innovations cannot take place. Within this frame-
work, intention plays the role of activating the
process of capability improvement.
In order to remain in a dynamic space of
action without a pre-established time horizon,
where agents can deploy ongoing learning
processes, we also need a genuine analytical open-
ness of the goals side. The very nature of novelty
should be outlined here. In a true dynamic evolv-
ing economy, in which time has a real signifi-
cance, goals, as well as means, must be open. For
example, new goals may appear, old ones hier-
archically re-organized, attained goals can be
removed from agents’ plans, and unattained ones
may be substituted by others. These changes bring
about learning processes as well as the emergence
of completely new actions not necessarily
explained by the mere acquisition of knowledge.
Although this is clearly recognised by authors,
particularly within the dynamic capabilities litera-
ture, to our knowledge, the goals side has not
been analytically integrated into the dynamic the-
oretical system. This integration needs to take
place in order to keep the dynamic consistency of
the evolutionary approach, particularly because
important sources of novelty may be located in
the open goals side.
3. FROM DYNAMIC CAPABILITIES TO
‘EVOLVING CAPABILITIES’: THE ROLE
OF INTENTION WITHIN INNOVATION
PROCESSES
An open structure where neither means nor goals
are given will permit us to move further away
from the ‘timeless system’ and to address addi-
tional features of economic change. It is in 
this context that the role of intention may be
addressed. The following paragraphs show, in the
first place, how agents’ intentions can activate a
capability development process and how this
process may in turn induce intentions towards
new goals. In this sense we will argue that capa-
bilities are not only dynamic, but also evolving,
adding therefore new pieces to the discussion on
self-transforming processes. However, showing
that capabilities evolve is not enough to address
the direction and the orientation of self-transfor-
mation processes. Why do organisations (and
their capabilities) evolve in different ways? Why
do they follow different development trajectories?
The analytical opening of the dynamics of goals
formulation permits us to search for new explana-
tory elements. We believe that the concept of
innovative intentionality, which will be defined in
this section, may contribute to advance in the
answering of those questions.
Agents use their imagination to conceive their
goals of action, based on a multitude of factors:
psychological, social, cultural, ethical, etc. They
invent the future they want to live and work
towards. This idea is valid whether we consider 
a goal in the very near future (to see a play
tonight), the middle term (achieving company
sales of one million Euros before the end of the
trimester) or the long term (discovering a univer-
sal cancer cure). For this reason we want to dis-
tinguish imagination from the typical Austrian
discovery approach to goals when addressing
entrepreneurship (Kirzner 1992). Opportunities
of action (business) are not hidden somewhere in
reality waiting to be discovered by the entrepre-
neur or the visionaire. It is the invention and
selection of goals that provides meaning to 
certain opportunities of action.
Although a goal may eventually be treated as a
static element, intention is inherently dynamic. It
can be seen as a tendency towards a goal which
firstly needs to be in the mind of the person (or
group of persons) as a purpose. The definition of
intention is linked to the concept of action plan.
‘To intend something is equivalent to have the
plan that something should be’ (Oxford Dictio-
nary of English). Something turns out to be a goal
through an intention driven by a motivation,
understood as a reason for acting in a particular
way (e.g. needs, desires, stimulus, impulses).
What is ultimately intended by these actions or
behaviour will be referred to as a goal, defined as
‘the object of a person’s ambition or effort’ (ibid.).
We consider therefore that the concepts of in-
tention and goal are strictly linked to that of 
action plan. Enacted intention is precisely what
permits us to differentiate between individuals’
(or groups of individuals) goals and their dreams
or desires. The latter do not necessarily activate
agents’ actions. On the contrary, the conception
of goals activates behaviour and actions oriented,
by means of enacted intention and will, towards
their achievement.
At the same time, the temporary and social
dimension of action implies that motivations,
desires and aspirations may vary while the agent
is acting; transforming his/her/its goals in com-
parison to what was initially intended. There is,
of course, a long tradition of psychological dis-
cussions and literature concerning the above
defined concepts. Although it is subject to great
controversy in philosophical and psychological
discussions the importance of intentionality for
explaining human action has been widely re-
cognised (see, for example, Ferrater-Mora 1994).
These topics are of great relevance to the under-
standing of human behaviour and are located in
the frontier between economics and psychology
(Brocas & Carrillo 2004).
Once we assume that enacted intention is a
performed tendency towards a goal and that nei-
ther intentions nor goals are given we are in a
position to reflect on the role played by inten-
tions within dynamic processes. The analytical
opening of goals and intentions permits us to 
see the dynamic consistency of the evolutionary
approach. In this approach to dynamic capabili-
ties we have found a causal linkage between the
formulation of certain goals (improved effective-
ness, achieving new and innovative forms of com-
parative advantage) and the development of
capabilities that are needed in order to reach
them. In this sense, intention activates a capability
development process.
The development of new or improved capabil-
ities reduces the gap between the goal the agent
intends to achieve and the real outcome of its
actions. Accordingly, the capability building pro-
cess may contribute to reducing this gap. How-
ever, departing from the assumption of open goals
we also need to consider the possibility that 
capabilities open up (as they do very often) new
possibilities of action. A person is unlikely to
state the goal of becoming a Russian translator
before learning Russian. Throughout an evolving
and interactive learning process, capabilities are
shaped and re-shaped through constant path-
dependent feedback with goals. New or improved
capabilities open up the possibility of setting new
goals. Actions intended to achieve them may also
imply the appearance of new capabilities or mod-
ifications in previously existing ones.
It is partly through the development and the
exercise of capabilities that dreams or desires may
turn into goals. The performative aspect of capa-
bilities is very important: in this context , as it is
for Feldman and Pentland (2003) and Howard-
Grenville (2005) in their discussions on organisa-
tional routines. Capabilities can activate intention.
A child can have the dream of becoming a profes-
sional pianist someday. It is only when the child
starts growing up and begins to study music and
play the piano at school that he/she feels that
he/she may one day become a professional
pianist. The corresponding intention and goal
can then be set: I want to be a pianist (in the
sense of I will be a pianist). What was imagined
one day is deemed possible after certain capabili-
ties are developed (and exercised). Continuing
with this example, let’s imagine that this person
succeeds in his/her piano studies and becomes a
professional pianist. The story might not end
here, as the pianist can set the goal of becoming
internationally famous and much in demand.
Succeeding in this new plan will require the
development of new technical and even political
and social abilities.
The previous example simply aims to illustrate
the idea that considering open means and open
goals (and open intention as a dynamic link
between capabilities and goals) allows for the ana-
lytical treatment of constant endogenous change
as there is constant feedback between imagined
intended goals and the actions deployed to reach
them (means). In 2000, the European Council of
Lisbon set the general goal for the European
Union of becoming the most dynamic and com-
petitive knowledge-based economy in the world
by 2010. In order to attain this objective some
intermediary goals have been set: reaching an
average of 3% of GDP in R&D expenditures,
building the European Higher Education Area
and also the European Research Area (ERA). As a
result of these goals, far-reaching transformations
in institutional (educational, scientific, political)
systems of the member countries have taken place
and will continue throughout the decade. Institu-
tions need to reorganise their structures and pro-
cedures. Furthermore, the construction of the
Higher Education and Research European Areas
will certainly open up new possibilities for many
agents in the European Union. The opening up
of opportunities might be translated into the for-
mulation of new individual and collective goals
that will trigger further endogenous transforma-
tions. Here again we illustrate how constant
endogenous change is only conceivable in a con-
text where neither goals nor means are a priori
considered as given.
The consideration of constant feedback pro-
cess between intentions, capabilities and goals
leads us to move from a dynamic perspective to
an evolving one. On the one hand, intention 
activates the development of new or improved capa-
bilities, reducing the gap between what agents
want to achieve and the outcome of their actions.
On the other hand, capabilities activate intention,
as the development of new or improved capabili-
ties makes it possible for agents to conceive new
goals. This feedback process is at the basis of the
self-transformation of agents’ action spaces.
Dynamism implies movement whereas evolution
means self-transformation over time. In an ana-
lytical framework where goals are submitted to
change and evolution, capabilities are not only
dynamic, but also evolving.
The idea that intentions and goals evolve over
time within an interactive environment, and that
by doing so they induce changes in agents’ capa-
bilities, which may also result in the formulation
of new goals and intentions and therefore in
renewed or improved capabilities is at the core of
our argument. As has been pointed out, once the
goals side of allocative processes remains analyti-
cally open, these become creative and dynamic
processes not predetermined to reach a stationary
state. We are therefore getting closer, from an
analytical perspective, to the reality of evolution-
ary systems, characterised by constant endoge-
nous change (Witt 2003) by novelty generation
(Metcalfe & Foster 2004) and thus by self-
transformation over time.
However, as has been stated in this section’s
introductory paragraph, this constant feedback
process, although necessary to address self-trans-
formation, is not enough to explain the direction
and intensity that transformation may have. We
argue that a further inquiry into the features and
quality of action goals is necessary to address
these matters.
It is a fact that individuals and organisations
are characterised and differentiated by their capa-
bilities and knowledge (a nurse and an engineer
develop different capabilities as do tennis and
chess players) but also that they may pursue dif-
ferent goals. Agents’ intentions and goals vary
greatly. What mainly distinguishes a football
team, a non-governmental organisation and a
bank is the goals they set: for example, winning
the league, assisting homeless people and increas-
ing profits. Of course, this also explains the 
differences between the knowledge the three
organisations acquire and the capabilities they
develop. They differ greatly and can cause a great
variety of changes in the environment, in what
we may call the action space. Moreover, we may
qualify the difference between goals in a sense
that helps us in achieving our explanatory pur-
poses: the analysis of the direction and intensity
of transformation.
Organisations might or might not aspire to
transforming the production and consumption
spaces of agents. They might intend to bring
about large or small transformations or they
might simply aspire to adapting to the transfor-
mations made by others. If they do not even
intend to adapt to external changes, the chances
of survival is low (it would depend on the charac-
teristics of the sector). The kind of intentions that
agents have is an explanatory factor of economic
dynamics, particularly of innovation dynamics
and economic change. Good examples of the 
different dynamics linked to intentions may be
found in the consequences of inheriting or selling
a firm. Although the capabilities of the organisa-
tions are essentially maintained when the owner-
ship changes, goals may change radically.
By addressing the kind of intentions, we are in
fact qualifying them and the goals they are linked
to. Agents may formulate and act towards goals
which transform more or less the realities they
perceive. The proposed concept of innovative
intentionality permits us to condense the previous
ideas. We define innovative intentionality as the
will to conceive or imagine realities which differ
from the perceived realities, with the purpose of
making them effective. Innovative intentionality is
a transforming impulse and will which orients
action towards the generation of change in reality.
As has been pointed out, innovative intentionali-
ty varies according to the agents, whether these
are individuals or businesses, social or political
organisations. We believe this is an important fact
that the explanation of economic evolution needs
to address. In simple terms, we are just stating
that what agents want to do and intend to do,
apart from what they know and are able to do, is
what orients interactive action and therefore con-
tributes to explaining the paths followed by self-
transformation processes.
Moreover, we are stating that agents are char-
acterised by different transforming intentions
(innovative intentionality). These facts could not
be integrated into the theory before considering
dynamic, changing, open goals of action and
before addressing the capability building process
as evolving and not simply dynamic. These con-
siderations open up, in our view, new ways 
to advance in the theoretical analysis of self-trans-
formation processes. Innovative intentionality
appears to be an interesting concept for address-
ing the divergence of innovative dynamics among
organisations and societies.
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Our argument may be summarized as follows: it
is by considering the essential dynamic dimen-
sion of intentions and action goals that we may
argue that individual and organisational dynamic
capabilities evolve. Capabilities are renewed and
reshaped by the appearance of new action goals.
A feed-back process between capabilities and
goals opens up new possibilities of action. This
may happen when agents (organisations and indi-
viduals) act towards their goals, transforming
capabilities and renewing the spaces where actions
are conceived and deployed. Moreover, agents’
goals vary greatly. They vary not only in the sense
that they are different but also because they
might be characterised by different transforming
intensities. We synthesize this idea through the
proposed concept of innovative intentionality,
defined as the will to conceive or imagine realities
which differ from the perceived realities, with the
purpose of making them effective. The hetero-
geneity of agents is not only a matter of differ-
ences in knowledge, but also of differences in
action goals and intentions. Agents may be quali-
fied by their innovative intentionality. This
source of heterogeneity generates also variety and
nourishes evolutionary processes.
We are not arguing, however, that all changes
that society experiences are the result of intended
action. Not every action is intended, as is shown
by the literature on routines. But by the same
token, not every outcome of an action is intend-
ed; the result might not come out as originally
planned. Interaction (or providence) might lead
to surprising unplanned results – as the develop-
ment of today’s global telecommunications 
system shows (Dosi et al. 2000: 2). However,
although not every action is intended and not
every novelty is the result of intended action,
agents’ intentions are key explanatory elements
for understanding important features of econom-
ic dynamics.6
An interesting question arises, following on
from the previous arguments, concerning the
relationship between the concepts of innovative
intentionality and entrepreneurship. Although it
was not the purpose of this paper to deal with the
innovative intentionality and entrepreneurship
relationship, it deserves in-depth discussion. The
role of intention in self-transforming economic
processes might permit us to refine the concept of
entrepreneurship. Metcalfe (2004: 167) has stat-
ed that:
entrepreneurs believe something that nobody
else believes, and do so with sufficient strength
of mind to act upon the belief and commit
economic resources to a business plan. This
belief must be grounded in the understanding
of the individual concerned and this under-
standing must be grounded in that individual’s
knowledge of the existing economic world.
(italics added)
What is the meaning of ‘strength of mind’? Inno-
vative intentionality, by incorporating to the
analysis the role played by will and intention
might somehow contribute to progress in Met-
calfe’s pointed direction.
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Endnotes
1 This consideration is essential in order to endoge-
nize the generation of novelties within economic
processes; and it enables us to overcome what we
have named ‘Schumpeter’s paradox’ (Encinar &
Muñoz 2006).
2 In the original version (Teece, Pisano & Shuen
1997: 516) the definition is slightly different ‘We
define dynamic capabilities as the firm’s ability to
integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and
external competences to address rapidly changing
environments. Dynamic capabilities thus reflect an
organization’s ability to achieve new and innovative
forms of competitive advantage given path depen-
dencies and market positions.’
3 The concept of action plan can be found in econo-
mists of different traditions such as Keynes (1936),
Stackelberg (1943), Debreu (1959), Boulding
(1991), Hayek (1937), etc. In some authors, plans
are merely a name (Debreu). In others, it is a cen-
tral concept of their works. It is also recognized in
neuroscience: Fuster (2003), for example, localizes
‘plans of action’ in the pre-frontal cortex of the
human brain.
4 If an organization decided to develop the necessary
technology to create pleasant living conditions on
Mars in order to build and sell houses there, it
would undoubtedly take an extremely long time
and therefore a very long learning process, before
succeeding. There is a high probability of failure in
this case.
5 A religious organization may set the goal of bring-
ing their deceased members back to life by devel-
oping mental capabilities.
6 According to Popper (1948), the role of the social
sciences is to explain the unintended consequences
of human actions. For the action to be rational
there must be a goal, an intention. However, given
the internal structure of personal action, this does
not prevent novelties or unforeseen consequences
arising from the interaction of plans.
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